Optimal Allotment Policy in Central Bank Open Market Operations by Ewerhart, Christian et al.
 
 
 
 
 
Institute for Empirical Research in Economics 
University of Zurich 
 
Working Paper Series 
ISSN 1424-0459 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper No. 201 
Optimal Allotment Policy in Central Bank 
Open Market Operations 
Christian Ewerhart, Nuno Cassola, Steen Ejerskov, Natacha Valla 
August 2004  
 
 
 
 
Optimal Allotment Policy in Central Bank
Open Market Operations1
Christian Ewerhart2
University of Zurich
Nuno Cassola3, Steen Ejerskov, Natacha Valla
European Central Bank
August 2004
1This paper has been drafted while the first-named author was visiting the Mone-
tary Policy Stance Division of the European Central Bank in fall 2002. Presentations of
material contained in this paper have been given during 2003 and 2004 at the Tinbergen
Institute of the University of Rotterdam, at the SAET conference on the island of Rhodes,
at the Annual Meeting of the German Economic Association in Zurich, and at the Uni-
versity College London. (Acknowledgements to be added.) The opinions expressed herein
are those of the authors, and do not necessarily represent those of the European Central
Bank.
2Postal address for correspondence: Institute for Empirical Research in Eco-
nomics (IEW), Winterthurerstrasse 30, CH-8006 Zurich, Switzerland. E-mail:
christian.ewerhart@iew.unizh.ch.
3E-mail: nuno.cassola@ecb.int.
1
Abstract
This paper derives a central bank’s optimal liquidity supply towards a money
market with an unrestricted lending facility. We show that when the effect of
liquidity on market rates is not too small, and the monetary authority cares
for both interest rates and liquidity conditions, then the optimal allotment
policy may entail a discontinuous reaction to initial conditions. In particular,
the model predicts a threshold level of liquidity below which the central bank
will not bail out the banking system. An estimation of the liquidity effect
for the euro area suggests that the discontinuity might have contributed to
the Eurosystem’s tight response to occurrences of underbidding during the
period June 2000 through March 2004.
JEL CODES: E43, E52
KEYWORDS: open market operations, liquidity effect, standing facilities,
underbidding
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1 Introduction
The topic of monetary policy implementation, i.e., the issue of how the
central bank implements its monetary decisions, has recently attracted sig-
nificant interest by both central bankers and academic researchers. The
aim of the present paper is to contribute to the understanding of monetary
policy implementation, especially concerning the economics that link the
decisions of the monetary authority and the behavior of short-term interest
rates in the interbank market. To this aim, we propose a simple model that
captures some of the institutional aspects of present-day operational frame-
works, where we focus on the active role of the central bank as a provider
of liquidity to the banking system.
Our analytic framework builds upon Woodford’s [15] basic model accord-
ing to which the central bank determines the level of market interest rates
essentially by positioning an interest rate corridor that consists of standing
lending and deposit facilities. Changes in policy rates are implemented by
moving the corridor up or down. Within the interest rate corridor, supposing
it is sufficiently wide as in the Federal Reserve System or in the Eurosystem,
there is some scope for market rates to vary on a daily basis.
In this case, interest rates may be steered indirectly by providing more or
less liquidity to the market. Changes to the market rate result then in par-
ticular from the so-called end-of-period liquidity effect (Hamilton [10]), that
summarizes the response of the market to expectations concerning tighter or
looser liquidity conditions at the end of the reserve accounting period. E.g.,
if the rate for overnight interbank loans appears to be too high within the
corridor from a central bank perspective, a liquidity injection would bring a
certain relief to market conditions, and would allow market rates to decline
to a more desirable level.
A central assumption made in this paper is that the central bank wishes to
implement its interest rate target within the corridor in a smooth manner.
3
By this formulation, we mean that the monetary authority will have a pref-
erence for keeping fluctuations, both in the market rate and in the central
bank credit outstanding to the banking sector, at a minimum. This can be a
plausible assumption, in particular if liquidity provided by the central bank
in one reserve maintenance period contributes to the fulfilment of reserve
requirements in another period, and if the central bank wishes to sustain
the effectiveness of its regular instruments. E.g., in the case of the oper-
ational system of the Eurosystem before March 2004, a large allotment in
the last main refinancing operation of a reserve maintenance period would
imply that the subsequent period starts with an excessively large central
bank credit. This situation, possibly deteriorated by a liquidity-providing
shock, would dwarf the first main refinancing operation in the new period,
which means that the regular instruments of implementation would tem-
porarily cease to ascertain an effective control over liquidity conditions in
the interbank market.
It will become clear that, in the absence of imbalances, there is no trade-off
between the criteria of interest rate and liquidity smoothing. Indeed, in this
case, the central bank may simply inject the aggregate reserve deficit, and
may thereby reach both interest rate and liquidity targets. However, in gen-
eral, this will not be feasible. In particular, there will be a trade-off between
interest rate and liquidity smoothing after an occurrence of underbidding
in an individual open market operation. Here and elsewhere, the term un-
derbidding refers to a situation where the total of the incoming bids in a
central bank operation is lower than the allotment that would be necessary
to implement the central bank’s regular liquidity policy. Because in any
given operation, the central bank can only allocate liquidity by satisfying
incoming bids, the allotment is bound to be below the necessary amount
in the case of underbidding, so that a temporary shortage of liquidity in
the money market will be created. Bailing out the banking system would
require an overly large allotment in the subsequent open market operation,
which causes the trade-off between interest rate and liquidity smoothing.
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To our knowledge, the issue of an optimal policy reaction to underbidding
has not been addressed so far in the literature. Most of the established the-
oretical literature on the interbank market for reserves in times of regular
operation, as originated by work of Poole [13], Ho and Saunders [11], Camp-
bell [4], Spindt and Hoffmeister [14], Hamilton [9], and others, has tended
to abstract from the central bank’s active role in the money market, with
only a few recent exceptions.
Ayuso and Repullo [1] assume that the central bank’s loss function penalizes
market rates below the target more severely than market rates above the
target. This induces the central bank to follow a tight allotment policy. As
a consequence, allotments in fixed-rate tenders (where banks pay the target
rate) are profitable, generating overbidding. However, in a variable-rate
tender with pre-announced liquidity injection, there is a bidding equilibrium
without excess demand.
Bartolini, Bertola and Prati [3] develop an intertemporal model of the mar-
ket for Federal funds allowing for daily central bank intervention. Without
intervention, the expected variance of the market rate is increasing over the
reserve accounting period. With unconstrained intervention, however, the
central bank may implement its target interest rate in all but the final day of
the reserve accounting period. The model thereby allows a positive analy-
sis of the consequences of various central bank policies on the time-series
properties of the Federal funds rate.
Bartolini, Bertola and Prati [2] offer an explanation for the empirical ob-
servation that banks in the U.S. tend to hold more reserves on settlement
days than on other days of the reserve accounting period. It is shown that
with uncertain reserve requirements, transaction costs, and constant market
rates, demand for reserves is higher on the second day of a two-day period
than on the first day. While the paper does not write out an objective
function for the central bank, it discusses informally the trade-off between a
higher interest rate vis-a`-vis increased reserves on settlement day from the
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central bank’s perspective.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe
the indirect steering of interest rates via the liquidity effect and derive the
liquidity target from the interest rate target. In Section 3, we consider
allotment decisions in two consecutive open market operations, and derive
the benchmark allotment in the first operation that allows to satisfy both
the interest rate and the liquidity target in the second operation. Section 4
analyzes the optimal policy reaction to underbidding, and its responsiveness
to changes in the initial conditions. In Section 5, we quantify the liquidity
effect in the euro area, and evaluate the practical relevance of the identified
discontinuity. Section 6 discusses robustness and the case of excess liquidity
after the first operation. Section 7 concludes. The Appendix contains the
proof of Proposition 4.
2 Steering interest rates via the liquidity effect
We consider a single reserve accounting or maintenance period represented
by the interval [0;T ], where T > 0. The expected aggregate liquidity sup-
ply provided through central bank operations over the maintenance period
will be denoted by S. Aggregate liquidity demand is equal to the sum of
exogenous aggregate reserve requirements R and stochastic autonomous liq-
uidity factors eA. Liquidity demand is assumed to be perfectly inelastic.
Autonomous liquidity factors realize at some time ts, where 0 < ts < T . We
will denote by G(.) the cumulative distribution function corresponding toeA. Figure 1 shows the empirical distribution of autonomous factors in the
euro area. - place
Figure 1
here -Standing facilities offer individual banks the opportunity to borrow and lend
an arbitrary amount overnight at the marginal lending rate rL and the de-
posit rate rD < rL, respectively. Clearly, in the absense of a deposit facility,
we have rD = 0. From the inelasticity of demand at the end of the reserve
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maintenance period and from the availability of the standing facilities, it
follows that the market rate rs(S, eA) prevailing after the realization of the
autonomous factor shock eA is equal to one of the corridor rates, depending
on whether there is excess demand or excess supply at the end of that given
period. Specifically, we have
rs(S, eA) =



rL if S ≤ R+ eA
rD if S > R+ eA.
Thus, in the model the market rate reaches the marginal lending rate when
the aggregate average liquidity supply is below aggregate demand, and anal-
ogously the market rate drops to the deposit rate when supply exceeds de-
mand. Hence, with reference to the rational expectations hypothesis, the
level of the market rate within the period can be expressed as a weighted
average of the rates of the standing facilities, where the weights are given
by the respective probabilities that the upper and lower boundaries of the
interest rate corridor are reached at the end of the reserve accounting period.
Proposition 1. Let S denote the central bank’s aggregate liquidity sup-
ply expected for the maintenance period, and assume that the interest rate
follows a martingale process. Then the market rate before time ts is given
by
r(S) = (1−G(S −R))rL +G(S −R)rD, (1)
where G(S − R) is the probability of ending the maintenance period with
recourse to the deposit facility.
Proof. See text above. ¤
Proposition 1 provides a link between the central bank’s supply of liquidity
and the market rate prevailing on the interbank market. E.g., if the market
expects the allotment policy to be restrictive, or else that autonomous factors
will drain the banking system after the last operation in a given period,
then the market rate will increase above the mid of the corridor. Indeed,
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the existing experience with corridor systems suggests that this mechanisms
captures the first-order determinant for short-term money market rates.
Derivation of the liquidity target. Proposition 1 suggests that the mon-
etary authority, in order to implement its interest rate target r∗ ∈ (rD; rL),
would have to provide for average liquidity conditions S∗ such that
r∗ = (1−G(S∗ −R))rL +G(S∗ −R)rD.
Solving for S∗ gives the neutral average liquidity as a sum of aggregate
reserve requirements and a percentile of the autonomous factor distribution
S∗ = R+G−1(
rL − r∗
rL − rD ). (2)
E.g., in the typical case where the corridor is symmetric around the target
rate, i.e., when r∗ = (rL+rD)/2, the liquidity target would be just the sum of
reserve requirements and the median of the autonomous factor distribution.
As mentioned in the introduction, we will assume that the central bank is
interested in smooth implementation, captured by a target for the total cen-
tral bank credit L∗ outstanding to the banking system. A natural candidate
for L∗ results if the outstanding central bank credit is held constant over
the reserve accounting period, so that we define
L∗ :=
S∗
T
. (3)
Indeed, under this condition, a constant volume L∗ of outstanding central
bank credit just implements the interest rate target r∗.
3 Benchmark allotments
We consider now in more detail the central bank’s allotment decision in the
last regular operation of the reserve accounting period [0;T ]. We envisage a
central bank that, like the ECB, performs regular operations that are spaced
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on the time axis (not daily), with each operation providing a significant
fraction of the overall liquidity supply in the current period. The possibility
of additional non-regular open market activities such as fine-tuning will be
ignored.
While in principle, there can be several regular operations providing liquidity
during the reserve maintenance period, it will be sufficient for our purposes
to model explicitly only the last two operations in the period, and to consider
an aggregate of the supply through earlier operations. See Figure 2 for
illustration. Specifically, we consider the penultimate operation (henceforth - place
Figure 2
here -
tender A) and the last operation (tender B). Let tA and tB denote the time of
tenders A and B, respectively, where 0 < tA < tB < ts. Moreover, let XA ≥
0 andXB ≥ 0 be the allotment volumes in tenders A and B, respectively, and
let S0 denote the liquidity supply for the current reserve maintenance period
provided by operations before tender A. For specificity, we will assume that
the liquidity allocated in tenders A and B is outstanding over the time
intervals [tA;T ] and [tB;T ], respectively, while liquidity provided in earlier
operations matures before tB.
Under these assumptions, the expected aggregate liquidity supply at the end
of the period is given by
S := S(XA,XB) := S0 + (T − tA)XA + (T − tB)XB. (4)
Replacing S by S∗ and subsequently solving for XB yields the allotment
that implements the interest rate target r∗ as
XbB(XA) :=
1
T − tB
{S∗ − S0 − (T − tA)XA}. (5)
This amount will be referred to as the benchmark allotment in tender B.
With this allotment, the central bank implements the target interest rate
r∗.4
4Indeed, formula (5) is a formal counterpart of the Eurosystem’s definition (see [5]).
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To determine the allotment necessary to implement L∗, note that from the
assumptions on the time structure made above, the outstanding liquidity
after tender B is simply the sum of the allotments made in tenders A and
B, i.e.,
L := L(XA,XB) := XA +XB. (6)
Implementing the liquidity target L∗ requires therefore an allotment of the
liquidity refill:
X lB(XA) = L∗ −XA. (7)
However, as the next proposition shows, this will be typically inconsistent
with implementing the interest rate target.
Proposition 2. The central bank can implement both the interest rate and
the liquidity target simultaneously if and only if
XA = XbA :=
1
tB − tA
(tBL∗ − S0). (8)
However, if XA < XbA, then L > L∗ or r(S) > r∗. Moreover, if XA > XbA,
then L < L∗ or r(S) < r∗.
Proof. The first assertion follows immediately from X lB(XA) = Xb(XA)
using (5), (7), and (3). Consider now the case XA < XbA. If XB < XbB(XA),
then r(S) > r∗, so that we are done in this case. Assume therefore that
XB ≥ XbB(XA). Then
XA +XB ≥ XA +XbB(XA)
=
1
T − tB
{S∗ − S0 − (tB − tA)XA}
>
1
T − tB
{S∗ − S0 − (tB − tA)XbA}
= L∗.
Thus, we have L > L∗. The case XA > XbA can be treated analogously and
is therefore omitted. ¤
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We will refer to XbA as the benchmark allotment in tender A. In the se-
quel, we will focus on the case where XA < XbA, and refer to this case as
underbidding. Under this condition, the banking system has built up a red
position at the time of tender B, i.e., in order to satisfy reserve requirements
as an average over the maintenance period, the outstanding central bank
credit after tender B must exceed L∗ or the interest rate will increase above
r∗. Thus, following an event of underbidding, there is a trade-off between
liquidity and interest rate smoothing.
4 Optimal allotment
We will impose that the central bank minimizes a weighted sum of quadratic
deviations from interest rate and liquidity targets by choosing an optimal
allotment XB in the last operation. Assuming for simplicity that the central
bank’s allotment constraint (given by the total of incoming bids) is not
binding in tender B, the central bank’s problem has the form
X∗B(XA) = arg minXB≥0
(r(S)− r∗)2 + µ(L− L∗)2 (9)
s.t. (1), (4), (3), and (6),
where µ > 0 is the weight assigned by the central bank to the liquidity
target. This problem asks for the optimal point on the feasibility curve, i.e.,
the set of combinations of quadratic interest rate and liquidity deviations
that result from feasible allotments in tender B. The involved trade-off is
that a lower XB leads to an increased market rate, while the outstanding
liquidity is lowered. The next proposition gives a range for the optimal
allotment in tender B, after an occurrence of underbidding in tender A.
Proposition 3. Assume that XA < XbA. Then X lB(XA) < XbB(XA), and
the optimal allotment X∗B(XA) lies in the open interval (X lB(XA);XbB(XA)).
Proof. By Proposition 2, if XA < XbA, and XA +XB ≤ L∗, we must have
that r(S) > r∗, and therefore XB < XbB(XA). Replacing XB by X lB(XA)
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yields the first assertion. Consider now the necessary first order conditions
for an optimal allotment X∗B(XA), which reads
r0(S)(r(S)− r∗)(T − tB) + µ(L− L∗) = 0, (10)
where S = S(XA,X∗B(XA)). By Proposition 1, we have r0(S) < 0. To
provoke a contradiction, assume that X∗B(XA) ≥ XbB(XA). But then r(S) ≤
r∗. From Proposition 2, in the case of underbidding, we must therefore
have L = L(XA,X∗B(XA)) > L∗. However, this contradicts (10), proving
X∗B(XA) < XbB(XA). Similarly, if X∗B(XA) ≤ L∗ − XA, then L ≤ L∗.
By Proposition 2, this implies r(S) > r∗, contradicting (10). This proves
X∗B(XA) > X lB(XA), and thereby the proposition. ¤
Thus, the optimal allotment lies betwen two focal allotment sizes. The first
is the benchmark amount, i.e., the allotment that ends the maintenance
period with an average liquidity position that allows banks to satisfy reserve
requirements in a regular way. With this allotment, the interest rate target
r = r∗ is met, but the outstanding central bank credit will exceed the target
L∗. The second focal allotment size is the liquidity refill that matches the
target L = L∗ for the outstanding central bank credit. This allotment is
too small to establish neutral conditions at the end of the period, forcing
interest rates to increase above the target r∗.
What is the shape of the feasibility curve between these two points? To
answer this question, note that the first-order Taylor expansion of the right-
hand side of equation (1) with respect to S around S∗ reads
r(S) ≈ r∗ − ρ(S − S∗),
where
ρ := G0(S∗ −R)(rL − rD) (11)
is a measure of the end-of-period liquidity effect for small variations in S.
Proposition 3 tells us that S(XA,X∗B(XA)) < S∗ after an occurrence of
underbidding. If we lower XB from the benchmark allotment, this increases
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the interest rate, and lowers the outstanding credit. In a neighborhood of the
benchmark allotment, the monetary authority therefore faces a linear trade-
off between interest rate and liquidity smoothing. Ignoring higher-order
effects for the moment, this trade-off translates into a convex feasibility set
in the plane of quadratic deviations by a change of variables. In fact, in the
neighborhood of the benchmark allotment, the feasibility set has locally the
shape of a parabola.
For allotments that are significantly below the benchmark allotment, how-
ever, the central bank’s lending facility puts an upper bound on the quadratic
deviation from the interest rate target. Indeed, since the tails of the dis-
tribution of the autonomous liquidity factors must eventually diminish, the
feasibility curve, for small and declining values of XB, will bend backwards
and become concave. Figure 3 shows the shape of the feasibility curve for
an example where the target rate lies in the center of the corridor, i.e.,
r∗ = (rL + rD)/2, the autonomous factor distribution is normal, and the - place
Figure 3
here -
underbidding has been sufficiently pronounced. Clearly, if the underbidding
is very mild, so that even the liquidity-neutral allotment would not cause
the market rate to approach the marginal lending rate, then the trade-off
between liquidity and interest-rate smoothing is convex, and an interior so-
lution is optimal.
The two curves in Figure 3 represent the set of possible combinations of
quadratic deviations from the liquidity and interest rate target for two spe-
cific sets of initial conditions. The straight lines represent the central bank’s
indifference curves. Focus for the moment on the left hand curve, marked
by the phrase “weaker underbidding.” It can be seen from the illustration
that in this case, the optimal allotment is slightly smaller than the bench-
mark allotment in this example. However, the feasibility curve is concave
for intermediate values of XB, suggesting the possibility of a discontinuous
central bank reaction to smoothly changing parameters. In fact, we can
show that a discontinuity is quite typical if the liquidity effect is not too
small.
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Proposition 4. Assume that µ > 0 is not too small. Then there is a
threshold level X∗A ∈ (0;XbA), such that for any sufficiently small ε > 0, there
is a parameter σ∗A > 0, such that for all autonomous factor distributions
G(.) with standard deviation σA ≤ σ∗A, the optimal allotment X∗B(XA) lies
in the interval (XbB(XA)−ε;XbB(XA)) for XA > X∗A+ε, and in the interval
(X lB(XA);X lB(XA) + ε) for XA < X∗A − ε.
Proof. See the Appendix. ¤
The possibility of a discontinuous central bank reaction is illustrated in the
second curve that corresponds to a set-up with a slightly more pronounced
underbidding. Here, the optimal allotment is the very close to the liquidity
refill. The rationale for this possibility is that if the volume of tender A
has been insufficient, and tender B is close to the end of the period, then
the benchmark allotment would be very large. Injecting the benchmark al-
lotment would therefore imply that the outstanding central bank credit is
temporarily much larger than the target. On the other hand, once the al-
lotment is chosen to be tight, there will be essentially no further deviation
from the interest rate target by a somewhat tighter allotment. As a conse-
quence, the feasibility curve is concave for intermediate allotment volumes,
and it may be optimal to allocate only the amount that aligns the aggregate
outstanding central bank credit with the target level.
5 Estimation of the liquidity effect
As a validation of the practical relevance of Proposition 4, we will now
estimate the size of the liquidity effect for the case of the euro area. The
method of estimation is indirect, and relies on results obtained in Section
2. Indeed, by Proposition 1, the impact of a liquidity injection on the
market rate is just a linear transformation of the cumulative distribution
function G(.) of autonomous liquidity factors. It is therefore sufficient for
our purposes to estimate G(.).
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The data set used comprises daily actuals of aggregate autonomous liquidity
factors in the euro area, as well as certain forecasts on these figures that
have been published by the ECB since the end of June 2000. The data has
been taken from material made available by the ECB in the forefront of
the January 2005 workshop on monetary policy implementation in the euro
area. The data covers altogether 43 maintenance periods, the first of which
ended July 23, 2000, and the last of which ended January 23, 2004.
For every reserve maintenance period m = 1, ..., 43, we have calculated the
unanticipated component of the changes to autonomous liquidity factors,
in the sequel referred to as the autonomous factor shock, as follows: Let
A(d) denote autonomous liquidity factors at calendar date d. Denote by
d0(m) the date of the announcement of the last main refinancing operation
in maintenance period m, and by d1(m) the date of the last day in period
m. Moreover, let Af(m) denote the forecasted average of the autonomous
liquidity factors over the period d0(m) through d1(m), as published by the
ECB at date d0(m). Then the autonomous factor shock at the end of period
m is defined as
B(m) :=
d1(m)X
d=d0(m)
{A(d)−Af(m)}.
We found that the mean of the historical distribution of the variable B(m)
over the considered period is B = −0.1 bn euro days, and that its standard
deviation is σB = 8.8 bn euro days.
Assuming a normally distributed distribution, the liquidity effect can be
quantified via equation (11) in a one-dimensional figure of ρ ≈ 9.0 basis
points per bn euro days. It should be noted, though, that our estimation is
based on the assumption that the liquidity situation is perfectly observable
for market participants. In reality, the effect of a liquidity imbalance in
the market should be smaller than this figure due to imperfect observability
of autonomous liquidity factors (cf. Ewerhart et al. [8]). Indeed, using
an alternative approach that estimates the spread between EONIA and the
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mid of the interest rate corridor as a function of a large vector of observable
parameters, Wurtz [16] finds a value of about half the size of our estimate.
A numerical example. We have used the above estimation result to
calculate two feasibility curves numerically (cf. Figure 3). In both scenarios,
the parameters have been fixed as follows:
rD = 3.75% r∗ = 4.75% rL = 5.75%
R = 120 S0 = 99
tA = 0.7 tB = 0.95 T = 1
The distribution of autonomous factors was assumed to be normal with
mean zero and standard deviation 0.3 ≈ σB/30 days. In the first scenario
(“weaker underbidding”), we assumed XA = 51, in the second (“stronger
underbidding”) XA = 50. To check the robustness of our predictions with
respect to potential estimation errors, we have repeated the computation for
a doubled standard deviation (corresponding to a smaller liquidity effect),
with no qualitative changes in the results.
6 Extensions
Overlapping operations. The model employed in the formal analysis re-
lies on the assumption that operations do not hang over into the subsequent
maintenance period. Taking account of the effects of the allotment policy
on liquidity and interest rate smoothing in the subsequent period leads to
an infinite-horizon set-up with discounting as expressed by the central bank
objective function
bU = −Z ∞
t0
δt−t0{(rt − r∗)2 + µ(Lt − L∗)2}dt,
where t0 is the time of the last tender in the prevailing maintenance pe-
riod, the parameters rt and Lt denote the interest rate and the outstanding
central bank credit at time t, and δ ∈ (0; 1) is the discount factor. In the
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working paper version [7], we calculate numerically the optimal intertempo-
ral allotment policy in a set-up with four overlapping operations per period
and a linear approximation of the liquidity effect. It turns out that the shape
of the feasibility curve does not differ significantly from our prediction in the
one-period model.
The intuitive reason for the robustness is that the central bank will optimally
reduce much of the imbalance with the first operation in the subsequent
reserve maintenance period. As a consequence, the effect of the liquidity
imbalance on the interest rate in the subsequent period is very small, and
the effect on the outstanding liquidity is essentially restricted to the time
before the first operation in the subsequent period. Thus, in a first-order
approximation, the infinite-horizon set-up reduces to a one-period problem
with a modified weight on the liquidity deviation, as given by
bµ = µ 1− tB
1 + t0A − tB
,
where t0A denotes the time of the first open market operation in the sub-
sequent period. As a consequence, the theoretical predictions remain un-
affected by considering an infinite-horizon set-up. In fact, in the case of
the euro area, the propagation of the liquidity imbalance beyond the second
open market operation of the subsequent reserve maintenance period was
effectively made impossible by the use of so-called split operations (see [6]).
Excess liquidity. A variation of the one-period model occurs if there is ex-
cess liquidity before tender B. In the model, the case XA > XbA corresponds
to an interpretation where the monetary authority has decided to allot in
tender A more than the benchmark amount. In reality, the more likely case
would be that a liquidity-providing shock occurs between tenders A and B.
There are again two focal allotment sizes. The first is obviously the bench-
mark amount XbB(XA), that guarantees that the overall liquidity position
at the end of the maintenance period is such that the market rate reaches
both the marginal lending and the deposit rate with equal probability. The
benchmark would typically be small in this scenario.
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The second focal allotment X lB(XA), which is larger in this scenario, is
the one that generates, from the settlement day of tender B onwards, an
outstanding central bank credit that corresponds to the target L∗. Allotting
the liquidity refill means here to flood the market with liquidity, so that the
market rate would drop to the deposit rate. However, in contrast to the
scenario of an undersized tender B, the theoretically optimal allotment may
not be feasible due to insufficient demand. One can show that the shape of
the feasibility curve is very similar to the underbidding case. Also in this
case, the monetary authority faces a non-convex trade-off between liquidity
and interest rate smoothing.
7 Conclusion
On several occasions during the period June 2000 through March 2004, the
Eurosystem experienced underbidding in its liquidity-providing open mar-
ket operations, implying a temporary tightness in the euro money market.
While the demand in the subsequent operation was typically very strong,
the European Central Bank regularly did not decide to fully alleviate the liq-
uidity shortage, causing short-term interest rates to raise significantly above
the main policy rate. In this paper, we have derived the optimal allotment
in response to underbidding in a model that captures some of the insti-
tutional features of the Eurosystem’s operational framework for monetary
policy implementation.
The formal analysis suggests that, somewhat surprisingly, creating a sub-
stantial monetary tightness at the end of the maintenance period after an
occurrence of underbidding may be consistent with pursuing an optimal al-
lotment policy. In fact, we showed that there is a threshold band for the
accumulated aggregate liquidity position in the banking system at the last
open market operation in a given maintenance period, so that the benchmark
allotment is optimal whenever liquidity conditions are above the threshold,
and a tight allotment is optimal whenever liquidity conditions are below the
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threshold. This provides a possible explanation for the Eurosystem’s recur-
ring and significant deviations from the benchmark allotment rule following
occurences of significant underbidding.5
The analysis may also provide a rationale for the recent changes of the op-
erational framework, implemented by the ECB in March 2004. The new
framework relies on non-overlapping transactions with a maturity of one
week only. Transactions do also not hang over into the subsequent period,
and the Governing Council confines itself to making policy decisions only
at the beginning of maintenance periods. With the new scheme, interest
rate expectations should not affect the overnight rate in the current mainte-
nance period, so that underbidding should be much less likely under the new
regime. In this sense, the recently implemented changes to the operational
framework would make the discontinuous reaction to unbalanced liquidity
conditions less often necessary, and would therefore allow commercial banks
to satisfy their reserve requirements in a smoother way than before March
2004.
8 Appendix. Proof of Proposition 4.
In the sequel, we will use the notation
D(XA,XB) := (r(S(XA,XB))− r∗)2 + µ(L(XA,XB)− L∗)2
for the weighted sum of the deviations from the central bank’s interest rate
and liquidity targets. The proof proceeds in six steps.
5An alternative explanation for the ECB’s reluctance to bail out the banking system
after an occurrence of underbidding is that the increased rates at the end of the period
should make underbidding unprofitable. However, this argument should properly be valid
only for the initial episodes of underbidding. It was realized soon that, unexpectedly, the
two-week swap rate continued to fall below the minimum bid rate on the day of a critical
operation, despite the substantial threat (see Table I in [6]). Proposition 4 suggests an
explanation that is independent of reputational effects.
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Step 1. Choose X∗A such that
D(X∗A,XbB(X∗A)) = (rL − r∗)2. (12)
In Figure 3, this allotment corresponds to the intersection of the abscissa
with an indifference curve through the point (0; (rL−r∗)2), which is located
just above the point corresponding to the liquidity refill. We claim that, if µ
is not too small, then such an X∗A ∈ (0;XbA) exists. To see why, we consider
allotments XA = 0 and XA = XbA in the sequel. Note that
D(0,XbB(0)) = µ(XbB(0)− L∗)2.
Thus, if
µ > µ∗ :=
(rL − r∗)2
(XbB(0)− L∗)2
,
one obtains
D(0,XbB(0)) > (rL − r∗)2.
Clearly, the parameter µ∗ is finite because XbB(0) > L∗ by Proposition 2.
On the other hand,
D(XbA,XbB(XbA)) = 0 < (rL − r∗)2.
Hence, by the continuity of G(.), and by the intermediate value theorem, if
µ is not too small, there exists an X∗A ∈ (0;XbA) satisfying (12).
Step 2. Let ε ∈ (0;X∗A). Assume that XA < X∗A − ε. By Proposition
3, we know that X∗B(XA) > X lB(XA). We have to show that X∗B(XA) <
X lB(XA) + ε. To provoke a contradiction, we assume
X∗B(XA) ≥ X lB(XA) + ε. (13)
The idea will be to show that under condition (13), the allotment X∗B(XA)
would be dominated by the benchmark allotment. Note first that from (13),
L(XA,X∗B(XA))− L∗ ≥ ε.
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Thus, using the optimality of X∗B(XA), we have
(r(S(XA,X lB(XA)))− r∗)2 = D(XA,X lB(XA))
≥ D(XA,X∗B(XA))
≥ (r(S(XA,X∗B(XA)))− r∗)2 + µε2.
This implies
(r(S(XA,X∗B(XA)))− r∗)2 ≤ (rL − r∗)2 − µε2. (14)
In step 5 of the proof, we will determine a value σ∗A > 0 such that (14)
cannot hold for distributions G(.) with a standard deviation σA ≤ σ∗A.
Step 3. We continue to consider the case XA < X∗A− ε. We show first that
X∗A +XbB(X∗A) ≥ XA +X∗B(XA). (15)
Indeed, otherwise we had by Proposition 2 that
0 < X∗A +XbB(X∗A)− L∗ < XA +X∗B(XA)− L∗. (16)
On the other hand, we have
S∗ > S(X∗A,X lB(X∗A)) > S(XA,X lB(XA)),
and therefore
0 < r(S(X∗A,X lB(X∗A)))− r∗ < r(S(XA,X lB(XA)))− r∗ (17)
Inequalities (16) and (17) imply that
D(XA,X∗B(XA)) ≥ µ(XA +X∗B(XA)− L∗)2
> µ(X∗A +XbB(X∗A)− L∗)2
= (rL − r∗)2
> (r(S(XA,X lB(XA)))− r∗)2
= D(XA,X lB(XA)),
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contradicting the optimality of X∗B(XA). This proves (15), and therefore
X∗B(XA) ≤ X∗A −XA +XbB(X∗A).
Hence, taking account of S(XA,XbB(XA)) = S∗, we find that
S(XA,X∗B(XA)) ≤ S∗ − (tB − tA)(X∗A −XA) < S∗ − (tB − tA)ε.
Using (2) yields
S(XA,X∗B(XA))−R < G−1(
rL − r∗
rL − rD )− (tB − tA)ε. (18)
In order to proceed, we will need an auxiliary result from probability the-
ory which we state and prove in the subsequent step for lack of a suitable
reference.
Step 4. Let α ∈ (0; 1) and β > 0 such that
σA < β
√
1− α. (19)
We claim then that
pr{ eA ≤ G−1(α)− β} ≤ σ2A
β − σA/
√
1− α
, (20)
which will be seen to be a one-sided inequality of the Chebyshev type for
deviations from the α percentile. To prove the claim, note that from Cheby-
shev’s inequality (see, e.g., [12]),
pr{| eA−E[ eA]| ≥ σA√
1− α
} ≤ 1− α.
A fortiori,
pr{ eA ≥ E[ eA] + σA√
1− α
} ≤ 1− α.
Thus, an upper bound for the α percentile relative to the mean can be given
by
G−1(α) ≤ E[ eA] + σA√
1− α
.
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Applied to the above problem, this implies
pr{ eA ≤ G−1(α)− β} ≤ pr{ eA−E[ eA] ≤ σA√
1− α
− β}
≤ pr{| eA−E[ eA]| ≤ β − σA√
1− α
},
where we have used assumption (19). Applying Chebychev’s inequality an-
other time proves the claim.
Step 5. Combining (18) and (20), we get
0 < G(S(XA,X∗B(XA))−R) <
σ2A
β − σA/
√
1− α
, (21)
where α = (rL − r∗)/(rL − rD) and β = (tB − tA)ε > 0. Thus, if σA → 0,
then also the right-hand side of (21) goes to zero. From
(r(S)− r∗) = (rL − rD)(1− α−1G(S −R)),
we see that
(r(S(XA,X∗B(XA)))− r∗)2 → (rL − r∗)2
for σA → 0. Thus, there exists σ∗A > 0 such that for all distributions given
by G(.) with standard deviation σA ≤ σ∗A, we have that (14) is not satisfied.
For these distributions, condition (13) implies a contradiction, so that we
have shown the first part of the proposition.
Step 6. Consider now allotments XA > X∗A + ε. We wish to show that
X∗B(XA) > XbB(XA)− ε. As above, to provoke a contradiction, we assume
X∗B(XA) ≤ XbB(XA)− ε. (22)
The idea is to show that in this case, the allotment X∗B(XA) would be
dominated by the benchmark allotment. Indeed, from (22) and (2),
S(XA,X∗B(XA))−R ≤ S∗ −R− (T − tB)ε
= G−1(α)− (T − tB)ε.
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Applying inequality (20), we find
G(S(XA,X∗B(XA))−R) ≤
σ2A
β0 − σA/
√
1− α
,
where β0 = (T − tB)ε. As in Step 5, this implies that
D(XA,X∗B(XA)) ≥ (r(S(XA,X∗B(XA)))− r∗)2 → (rL − r∗)2 (23)
for σA → 0. On the other hand,
XA +XbB(XA) < X∗A +XbB(X∗A)−
tB − tA
T − tB
ε,
so that
D(XA,XbB(XA)) < µ(X∗A +XbB(X∗A)− L∗ −
tB − tA
T − tB
ε)2
= (rL − r∗ −√µtB − tA
T − tB
ε)2
< (rL − r∗)2,
contradicting (23), given that X∗B(XA) has been assumed to be optimal.
This proves the second part of the proposition. ¤
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Figure 1. The cumulative distribution function of the empirical distribution of the unanticipated
autonomous liquidity factor shock (liquidity absorbing) in the euro area in between the last 
operation and the end of the reserve maintenance period. The data set covers the periods
ending in the months July 2000 through January 2004.
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Figure 2. The time structure of liquidity supply. There are two tenders at times tA and tB that
provide liquidity to the banking system. The central bank credit allotted in these operations
remains outstanding until the end of the reserve accounting period. Operations before tA are
not modeled explicitly, but represented by the liquidity aggregate S0. Central bank credit
allotted in these earlier operations is assumed to mature before tB.
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Figure 3. The feasibility curve after an event of underbidding. The benchmark allotment
implements the interest rate target, but misses the liquidity target. In contrast, the liquidity refill
implements the liquidity target, but misses the interest rate target. The optimal allotment is
close to the benchmark allotment for weaker underbidding and essentially equal to the liquidity
refill for stronger underbidding.
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